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Abstract
Recently, developed economies have witnessed an emerging dualism between the
so-called labor market ‘insiders and outsiders’—two groups facing divergent levels
of employment security and prospects. Those on the ‘inside’ occupy stable jobs,
while those on the ‘outside’ confront increased levels of social and economic risks.
There are, however, various prominent, but divergent, operationalizations of the
insider–outsider phenomenon. While some scholars opt for indicators rooted in cur-
rent labor market status of individuals, others prefer to consider occupational class
groups as bases of the insider–outsider divide. As these operationalizations of outsi-
derness capture different profiles of outsiders, we test the extent to which they lead
to consistent or inconsistent conclusions about electoral behavior. The article yields
two consistent findings that are robust across all the operationalizations: that out-
siders are less likely to vote for major right parties than are insiders, and that out-
siders are more likely to abstain from voting. Additionally, we find that occupation-
based outsiders tend to support radical right parties, while status-based outsiders
rather opt for radical left parties—a finding supported by the association between
social risk and authoritarian preferences. We test our expectations using multino-
mial logit models estimating vote choice on the first five waves of the European
Social Survey from 2002 to 2010 across western Europe.
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1. Introduction
Recently, developed economies have witnessed an emerging dualism between the so-called
labor market ‘insiders and outsiders’—two groups facing divergent levels of employment
security and prospects. Those on the ‘inside’ occupy stable jobs, while those on the ‘outside’
confront increased levels of social and economic risks. Research shows that differentiated
access to social welfare entitlements (social insurance/assistance, pensions, healthcare, etc.)
together with divergent labor market positions of the two groups carry socioeconomic implica-
tions (see Davidsson and Naczyk, 2009 for a review). Simultaneously, there are various promi-
nent, but divergent, operationalizations of the insider–outsider phenomenon. While some
scholars opt for indicators rooted in current labor market status of individuals, others prefer
to consider occupational class groups—as proxies of social risk level—as bases of the insider–
outsider divide. Consequently, while the presence of an insider–outsider divide in the
European societies is well established, it is unclear whether the insider–outsider distinction
translates into consistent behavior at the ballot box in light of its diverse operationalizations.
To assess whether the socioeconomic divide between insiders and outsiders translates
into consistent political behavior, we test whether and how insider–outsider status opera-
tionalized in diverse ways predicts vote choice. Previous work has considered political par-
ticipation of outsiders primarily as a response to party strategies, deriving hypotheses about
the potential weakening of traditional workers’ parties and the strengthening of radical
extremes (Lindvall and Rueda, 2013). Prior research has also found that insider–outsider
divides have only limited explanatory power for voting behavior as compared with tradi-
tional socioeconomic cleavages (cf. Emmenegger, 2009; Corbetta and Colloca, 2013), but
also that such divides can be shown to influence vote choice, policy preference and/or politi-
cal participation in distinct ways (Schlozman and Verba, 1979; Schur, 2003; Rueda, 2006;
H€ausermann and Schwander, 2011; Lindvall and Rueda, 2013; Marx and Picot, 2013;
Amable, 2014; Guillaud and Marx, 2014; H€ausermann et al., 2015; Marx, 2014). This
article takes a different approach, evaluating insiders’ and outsiders’ voting preferences in
cross-national context, using four prominent yet different operationalizations of insiders
and outsiders that are found in the literature (a) Rueda (2005); (b) H€ausermann and
Schwander (2011) and Schwander and H€ausermann (2013); (c) Emmenegger (2009);
(d) Rehm (2009).
The contribution this article makes is thus two-fold. First, we demonstrate that the exist-
ing literature contains discrepancies in the various operationalizations of insiders and out-
siders that may bias results, or at least, run the risk of ‘talking past each other’ by relying on
different indicators. Second, we utilize these distinct operationalizations in analyses of cross-
national voting preferences, which allows us to compare the consistency of four prominent
insider–outsider indicators and expand upon the received wisdom in the field. While all four
operationalizations of outsiderness capture somewhat different profiles of outsiders, the pur-
pose of this article is to test the effect of these different operationalizations on predicted elec-
toral behavior. We find two consistent findings that are robust across all the
operationalizations: that outsiders are less likely to vote for the major right than insiders,
and that outsiders are more likely to abstain from voting. Strikingly, we also find that
occupation-defined outsiders tend to support radical right parties, while status-defined out-
siders tend to opt for the radical left, a finding we attribute to the effect of social risk on indi-
vidual preferences.
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To test the outcomes across the four prominent operationalizations of outsiderness, we
employ multinomial logit analyses, extensively checked against alternative models, employ-
ing five waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) data from 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and
2010. While the insider–outsider distinction has been pinpointed as a relevant social divide
with important ramifications for the labor market and overall social parity, we find that out-
siders’ voting behavior is nuanced, with two consistent results holding across all four opera-
tionalizations: overall, outsiders are less likely to vote for the major right and have higher
rates of abstention than insiders. In addition, our analysis provides findings that highlight
the divergent nature of the various outsider operationalizations. While outsiders operation-
alized on the basis of current labor market status tend to support major left parties less,
rather turning to radical left parties, outsiders defined on the basis of occupational class
group conversely tend to lean away from the left in favor of the radical right.
2. What is outsiderness and how is it operationalized?
The distinction between insiders and outsiders lies mainly in the labor market, between those
who have stable and secure employment and those who do not [Rueda (2005); see also
Lindbeck and Snower (1989) and Saint-Paul (2002) for analyses of the relative power of
labor market insiders vis-a-vis outsiders]. However, this dualism is also seen as having
emerged within and issuing from the state itself, in the form of dualizing social policy (Palier
and Thelen, 2010; Emmenegger et al., 2012). European countries are interesting cases for
the study of social and labor market dualization because rather than containing frozen insti-
tutional structures that are resistant to change in spite of inherent structural problems, these
political systems have undergone piecemeal transformations that, arguably, have resulted in
increasing labor market and social welfare inequalities (Clegg, 2007; Davidsson and
Naczyk, 2009; Eichhorst and Hemerijck, 2010; Palier and Thelen, 2010; Eichhorst and
Marx, 2011).
However, a clear and consistent conceptualization of insiders and outsiders has yet to be
established. On the contrary, there exist several competing definitions of insiders and out-
siders in contemporary political science/social policy literature, which we employ in this
article in order to gain clarity on (a) what the different indicators and underlying concepts
entail and how they can be fruitfully compared, and (b) how utilizing different indicators of
outsiderness affects the findings—specifically in this article, how four different and promi-
nent operationalizations of outsiders affect vote choice.
The four operationalizations of outsiderness that we test in this article can be separated
into two categories: (a) current labor market status and (b) occupational class group, which
captures propensity for social risk. We discuss each category in turn. The first labor market
status-based operationalization of insiders–outsiders that we consider in this article is by
Rueda (2005), who divides insiders and outsiders along one dimension: current employment
status (cf. Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Lindbeck and Snower, 1989; Saint-Paul, 1996).
In other words, Rueda’s operationalization of insiders and outsiders is based on the actual
reported labor market status of individuals. It is a static conception that considers the cur-
rent job situation, not the past or future situations, nor the probability of unemployment.
Rueda thus defines insiders as ‘those with secure employment’, and outsiders as ‘those with-
out’. The author goes on to define insiders as ‘those workers with highly protected jobs, suf-
ficiently protected not to feel greatly threatened by high levels of unemployment’. Outsiders
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are defined as ‘either unemployed or hold[ing] jobs characterized by low salaries and low
levels of protection, employment rights, benefits, and social security privileges’ (Rueda,
2005, p. 62).
The second labor market status-based operationalization of outsiderness that we test in
this article comes from Emmenegger (2009), who, like Rueda, distinguishes between insiders
and outsiders based on their current labor market status. In line with recent literature that
highlights the need to distinguish between different types of outsiders, we utilize
Emmenegger’s operationalization (2009) of outsiders, which allows for this differentiation.
This measure divides survey respondents into five groups: (1) labor market insiders, who are
full-time employees under permanent contract who do not occupy a higher-grade professio-
nal, administrative or managerial position; (2) labor market outsiders, who are (a) employ-
ees working part-time (or less), (b) hold a temporary contract, or (c) are currently
unemployed; (3) ‘upscales’, who hold a higher-grade professional, administrative or mana-
gerial position; (4) self-employed; and (5) nonemployed, a group composed of students,
housewives/househusbands, retired persons, those helping family members, permanently dis-
abled/sick, or out of the labor force for other reasons (Emmenegger, 2009, p. 137). To keep
this measure more comparable with the others that do not explicitly distinguish the self- or
nonemployed, our empirical analysis focuses on the first three categories: upscales, insiders
and outsiders. In line with Emmenegger, we distinguish between three types of outsiders:
(a) those with limited work contracts; (b) those working part-time, defined as working less
than 30 hours per week (OECD Labour Market Statistics, 2016); and (c) the unemployed.
The Emmenegger measure thus contains five categories.
Alternatively, a separate strand of research emphasizes the risk of precarious employ-
ment based on occupational class. This political economy literature has established that
exposure to labor market risks shapes political preferences. The distinction can be made
between potential risk of falling into un- or under-employment, and realized risk of such sta-
tus, i.e. being currently unemployed (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Cusack et al., 2006;
Mughan, 2007; Rehm, 2009, 2011). This literature informs our second category of indica-
tors of outsiderness.
Consequently, the third indicator examined in this article, based on labor market risk
assessment according to occupational class, comes from H€ausermann and Schwander
(2011; Schwander and H€ausermann, 2013), who delineate insider–outsider status according
to a risk-based notion of labor market precariousness. These authors conceptualize outsider-
ness not as resulting only from a static snapshot of one’s employment status, but rather as
whether an individual belongs to an occupational class group that has above-average rates
of unemployment or atypical employment (based on country-specific workforce averages)—
i.e. a higher than average risk of vulnerable employment. Whether a person is currently
employed or not has less bearing on outsider status, they argue, than the person’s general
likelihood of being employed or unemployed over her life course, which is determined by
her occupational class group. Therefore, using cross-sectional data, H€ausermann and
Schwander group insiders and outsiders according to occupations, classifying individuals
into insider-occupations and outsider-occupations based on survey evidence of the incidence
of unemployment or atypical employment by occupational group. The occupations are clas-
sified using the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) International Standard
Classification of Occupations (ISCO) two-digit codes. This way of conceptualizing insiders
and outsiders takes social class as the basis for the classification of occupational groups; it
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draws on Kitschelt and Rehm (2005) and Oesch’s (2006) division of social classes in postin-
dustrial societies into five classes that share similar work conditions and rates of precarious-
ness (H€ausermann and Schwander, 2011). This conceptualization thus assigns risk values
not to individuals, but to specific occupational groups by country. Thus, all members of the
same group receive the same score. Rather than a general definition that is the same across
countries, this class-based conceptualization of outsiderness is a relative measure that varies
by country and group.
Moreover, the Schwander and H€ausermann measure also incorporates gender and age as
defining features of outsiderness, based on the prominent consensus in the literature that
postindustrial labor market advantages are structured not only by class, but also by gender
and age (Schwander and H€ausermann, 2013, p. 253). The authors argue that these should
be included as relevant variables in an operationalization of outsiderness, as numerous
scholars have shown that insider–outsider divides—that is, labor market dualization—are
contingent upon gender- and age-segregation, with women and youth being consistently dis-
advantaged in the labor market as compared to men and nonyouth workers (Taylor-Gooby,
1991; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Kitschelt and Rehm, 2006; Chauvel, 2009; Esping-Andersen,
2009). This risk-based measure of outsiderness, therefore, takes into account not only post-
industrial classes but also gender and age, to yield a combination of four classes, two sexes
and two age groups (below/above 40 years old), which results in a total of 17 occupational
groups. The group-specific rates of unemployment and atypical employment (i.e. involun-
tary part-time employment, fixed-term employment and helping family members) are then
compared with the workforce-average rates.
The insider–outsider measure is then separated into either a dichotomous measure or a
continuous measure. The dichotomous measure is computed by selecting all groups that
have a rate of atypical employment or unemployment that is higher than the workforce aver-
age, with all individuals in these groups being coded as outsiders. The continuous measure is
computed by subtracting the workforce average rate of atypical employment and unemploy-
ment from the group-specific rate and using the difference as the degree of outsiderness that
is then attributed to all members of the group. We employ the continuous measure in our
inferential analyses; however, the binary measure is useful for descriptive comparisons.
Finally, Rehm (2009) measures risk exposure at the occupational level. This measure
considers an individual’s risk of unemployment as a function of the rate of unemployment in
her occupation (at the first digit ISCO-88 level) in a given country and year, distinguishing
between nine different occupational categories. For each occupational category, Rehm cal-
culates the probability of becoming unemployed, based on occupational unemployment
rates calculated from EU labor force surveys for every occupational category by country and
year (Rehm, 2009).
It is useful here to discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of using the above
different measures of insiderness and outsiderness. First, the occupation-based measures
(Schwander/H€ausermann and Rehm) attribute characteristics to an individual that are
derived from her occupational group, while the individual herself may not actually manifest
a labor market risk (Schwander and H€ausermann, 2013, p. 251). Conversely, this measure
would consider a temporary part-time worker as an insider, for example, if he/she
were employed in an occupation with many insiders, or low levels of unemployment.
Whether one is classified as an outsider or an insider is contingent upon the country-specific
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workforce characteristics; therefore, it is a group-based, country-specific, relative measure of
outsiderness.
Some potential advantages to these measure are the relative stability of occupational
group vs. more transient labor market status, thus arguably providing a stronger bearing on
a person’s political preferences. In addition, this measure allows for the heterogeneity of the
outsider group, which is comprised in different countries of both high- and low-skilled
workers, different economic sectors, age groups, etc. However, this operationalization is
also considerably more complex than simple labor market status, and relies, as we have
seen, on detailed data that provide information on the occupational sector, as well as on
country-specific benchmark averages for determining whether an entire occupational group
can be considered to contain insiders or outsiders. This may lead to potential ecological fal-
lacy as individual insider/outsider characteristics are deduced from group risk factors. Thus,
these measure may mis-assign individuals due to the characteristics of their group.
The alternative static measures of Rueda or Emmenegger of current labor market status
may therefore yield some advantage because of their parsimony and more widely available
data. Simultaneously, they are more ephemeral measures than those based on occupation.
One could argue that these more simple labor market status measures do not adequately
capture the element of risk that characterizes labor market vulnerability in post-industrial
societies, in which one’s chances of holding permanent employment are known to vary dra-
matically according to skill level, gender (due to women’s exit from the labor force upon
child-rearing, particularly prominent in conservative welfare regimes), age, employment sec-
tor, and so on.
Furthermore, the Schwander and H€ausermann indicator also captures more than
insider–outsider labor market divides: it also captures age, gender, and occupation, which,
while arguably being fitting determinants of true labor market advantage or disadvantage,
are also classical predictors of political behavior. It could be argued, therefore, that this
more complex measure is not a suitable comparison with the simpler Rueda or Emmenegger
measures. Occupation and gender are indeed substantially more stable than labor market
status, which introduces the question of whether stable and transient indicators should be
expected to have the same explanatory power.
Indeed, as the Schwander and H€ausermann measure combines occupational risk with
considerations of gender and age as the basis for individual risk calculation, it may conse-
quently confound the effects of labor market risk, gender and age on political behavior.
Furthermore, this measure is temporally static, based on risk measures from only one year.
The Rehm occupation-based measure, on the other hand, considers only general occupation
groups. It does not consider gender and age in the definition of outsiderness, and is thus
independent of them. While perhaps a ‘cleaner’ measure of risk, it could be considered a dis-
advantage for the very fact that it does not explicitly account for the role of gender and age
in determining risk structures. Its advantage, however, is its over-time variation based on
particular labor market developments in each country in a given year. Clearly, deciding
which operationalization one uses has theoretical and empirical implications, as well as the
potential to affect research findings, which we confirm in our analyses below.
Therefore, while all four approaches seek to capture outsiderness, their logics differ quite
starkly. The striking discrepancy in identifying who falls into the insider and outsider cate-
gories, depending on which prominent conceptualization we use, can be seen when examin-
ing the data. Under the Schwander and H€ausermann (binary) measure, 82% of outsiders are
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female and are on average 47.5 years old. If we create two categories out of Rehm’s continu-
ous measures, considering those individuals who fall below the median level of risk as
insiders, and those above as outsiders, we see that only 51% of outsiders are women, and
their average age is 49.6 years. Using the Rueda definition, outsiders are 55% female, with a
strikingly lower average age of 39.1 years.1 The Emmenegger outsiders, disagreggated into
three groups, underline the diversity. While outsiders with temporary contracts are 47%
female with an average age of 36 years; outsiders working part-time are 80% female with
an average age of 44 years; and unemployed outsiders are 47% female with an average age
of 38.5 years. Thus, we see that a conceptualization of outsiderness that relies heavily on
gender and age for its composition, as compared to a conceptualization that does not explic-
itly take those characteristics into account, yields markedly different conclusions about the
makeup of this labor market group.
Table 1 compares the outsider measures directly. Note that the table uses the binary
Schwander and H€ausermann measure, and dichotomizes the Rehm measure into insiders
(with risk lower than median) and outsiders (risk higher than median). The table underlines
two observations. First is the diversity of the measures. For example, while 13% of the sample
from the ESS used in this study are viewed as outsiders by both the Schwander and
H€ausermann and Rueda operationalizations, about 43% are viewed as insiders by both. On
the contrary, almost 10% of the sample are Schwander and H€ausermann insiders but Rueda
outsiders, and a striking 34% are Schwander and H€ausermann outsiders but Rueda insiders.
The fact that these two measures ‘misplace’ almost 44% of the sample with respect to each
other, underscores their fundamental difference. These values are similar when comparing the
Schwander and H€ausermann measure with that of Emmenegger. Comparing the Rehm meas-
ure to that of Schwander and H€ausermann shows that these two measures ‘misplace’ 42% of
the sample with respect to each other. The second observation from Table 1 is the relatively
close association between the Rueda and Emmenegger measures. While no Rueda outsider is
categorized as an Emmenegger upscale or insider, only 10% of Emmenegger outsiders are
Rueda insiders, and a vast majority of these fall into the part-time outsider category.
Overall, we see that outsiderness defined on the basis of occupational class (Schwander
and H€ausermann; Rehm) leads to a distinct classification of individuals that differs from
outsiderness defined on the basis of labor market status. The differences between the two
occupational measures are primarily due to the inclusion of gender and age as criteria for
risk assessment on the part of Schwander and H€ausermann, and the time-variant measure of
occupational risk by Rehm. The aim of this article is to address the extent to which these dis-
tinct conceptions and operationalizations of outsiderness lead to consistent or divergent con-
clusions about these groups’ electoral behavior. The next section turns to consider the
interplay between outsiderness and politics, focusing on the expected voting patterns of
outsiders.
3. Outsiders and politics
The literature on insider–outsider politics implies that this new labor market dualization has
significant political potential. The literature has primarily focused on the political preferen-
ces of insiders and outsiders, consequently deducing their political behavior from their
1 See operationalization section below for measurement details.
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political outlooks. In so doing, the individual contributions suggest that the insider–outsider
divide forms a new basis for political behavior that has the potential to affect electoral out-
comes. Simultaneously, a review of the behavioral expectations uncovers limited consensus,
and a number of contradictory hypotheses.
One prominent strand of literature focuses on insider–outsider preferences—in particu-
lar, for distinct welfare policies across OECD countries, with an emphasis on identifying the
desired degree of redistribution and state investment (H€ausermann and Schwander, 2011).
These authors have shown outsiders to have stronger preferences for state intervention than
do insiders, with skill level being an important conditioning factor: low-skilled workers
favor redistribution, whereas high-skilled workers prefer social investment in the form of
education and employment services (see also H€ausermann et al., 2015; Gingrich and
H€ausermann, 2015).
Additionally, Rehm (2009) has demonstrated that labor market insecurity and risk of
unemployment lead to increased demand for redistribution, which establishes a correlation
with support for the left. However, while the emphasis on risk suggests a clear line of sup-
port for left parties, the insider–outsider literature, separate from the risk literature, has
emphasized the element of political exclusion in addition to redistribution. The distinction
with the insider–outsider strand of research lies in differentiating the ‘old left’ that no longer
represents the interests of the entire working class but rather the interests of those with
entrenched, stable, employment—the protected ‘insiders’. The key demarcation here is job
insecurity: outsiders’ preferences may be structured by support for redistribution on the one
hand, and relaxed employment protection (reduced barriers to employment) on the other.
Furthermore, Fernandez-Albertos and Manzano (2016) find that support for the welfare
state is conditional upon the level of dualization within the welfare state itself. Where the
welfare state is less redistributive, more strongly status-oriented (i.e. social-insurance based),
and labor markets are more dualized, economically disadvantaged groups will be less in
favor of general welfare state expansion. In contrast, disadvantaged groups are consistently
supportive of redistributive social policies as they benefit from these policies.
Thus, the implications for voting behavior of outsiders are mixed: while outsiders would
be supportive of increased redistribution, they will be less solidly attached to voting for the
major left than insiders, who comprise the left’s traditional constituency. Outsiders may
choose to support parties favoring labor market deregulation (i.e. liberal or conservative
parties), as labor market flexibility reduces labor market dualism. This may, however,
present a conflict of interest, as right-wing voting outsiders would be foregoing their
assumed redistributive preferences in prioritizing employment protection deregulation.
Therefore, at best, the literature is so far ambiguous about the political leanings of outsiders
and the theoretical motivations for these inclinations, a point that we summarize below with
competing, and seemingly contradictory, hypotheses about voting behavior.
Next we turn to a discussion of party strategies and outsiders. Explaining the strategies
of political parties based on an insider–outsider divide in the workforce has challenged tradi-
tional conceptions of Social Democratic parties, while only briefly touching on other major
party types. Rueda (2005, 2006) posits that Social Democratic parties consider insiders to
be their prime constituency, and indeed will favor this constituency at the expense of out-
siders when there exists a conflict between the two labor market groups. He further main-
tains that outsiders are less politically active than insiders, a claim for which this article finds
empirical support. Focusing on Sweden as an exemplary case, Lindvall and Rueda (2013)
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suggest that if Social Democratic parties pursue policies that are advantageous to insiders,
they lose outsiders’ electoral support, thereby incurring electoral punishment. In this case,
the authors find that outsiders in Sweden either vote for the (more radical) Left Party or
abstain from voting altogether. Where Social Democrats campaign on policies to attract out-
siders, they lose the insider vote to the major right. The distinction between the insider–out-
sider theory of partisanship and the traditional partisanship model (in which social
democratic parties represent labor, and conservative parties represent upscale groups) lies in
the assertion that not all labor is equally vulnerable to unemployment. This relative risk of
unemployment will differently affect the preferences of the two labor market groups, as well
as political parties’ incentives to represent them.
Yet another strand of research on insider–outsider politics underlines the heterogeneity
of the outsider group (Taylor-Gooby, 1991; Kitschelt and Rehm, 2006; Emmenegger, 2009;
H€ausermann and Schwander, 2011). The outsider classification may apply to men and
women differently, varying across age, skill level and welfare regime. Emmenegger (2009)
argues that the insider–outsider theory of politics ignores several important points. Among
these: it fails to consider a long-term perspective; does not adequately address the nuances of
electoral politics; and fails to give proper consideration to the fact that political parties offer
policy packages. Finally, Emmenegger argues that there are a number of reasons why
insiders and outsiders may actually share policy and party preferences—among these are
household composition, the inherent power imbalance between capital and labor and the
changeability of one’s labor market position.
Research on the party preferences of atypical workers in Germany in 2009 draws a dis-
tinction between two types of outsiders: atypical workers (fixed-term contracts, agency work
or marginal part-time employment) and the unemployed (Marx and Picot, 2013). These
authors’ findings echo the previous literature on insiders and outsiders in that the unem-
ployed are more likely to abstain from voting than insiders, and are more likely to vote for
the radical Left Party. Unlike the unemployed, atypical workers were not found to partici-
pate less in elections than insiders. These atypical workers were more likely to vote for the
Left Party and the Green Party and less likely to vote for the major right than were insiders,
again supporting the tendency of outsiders to vote left rather than right. Furthermore, an
inclination of outsiders to vote for the party or parties that would lessen the rigidity of
employment protection (thereby ‘opening up’ the labor market) was not borne out in these
authors’ findings, as the liberal right party (the FDP) did not attract the outsider vote.
Marx (2014) isolates the effect of a specific labor market risk by analyzing only one cate-
gory of outsiders—temporary workers. Here, temporary workers are found to support the
new left parties rather than the old left, as the former are less concerned with protecting the
entrenched interests of insiders than are the latter. While restricting the analysis to only tem-
porary workers rather than all types of outsiders limits the comparability of these research
findings to previous findings of the insider–outsider literature, it points to the need to distin-
guish between different categories of outsiders, as political preferences should not be
expected to be the same across them.
Finally, the political behavior of outsiders regarding support for radical parties that lie
outside the mainstream has become a topic of much recent scholarly and popular attention.
Lindvall and Rueda (2013) maintain that when major left parties cater to insiders’ demands,
outsiders will be pushed to either abstain from voting or consider other options.
These alternative options depend on the party system, but may range from radical left
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support as in Sweden in 1998, to extreme right parties that receive voter support of the
unemployed, as in France, Finland and several other European countries. So-called ‘losers’
of the labor market (nonstandard and low-skilled workers) may look to radical or protest
parties who offer alluring promises to those who feel they have suffered from globalization
(Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). Right-wing populist parties could be seen as attracting outsiders
who resent mainstream parties and established political elites (Rueda, 2005; King and
Rueda, 2008). Moreover, radical left parties may attract outsiders who seek an overhaul of
the economic and political establishment along with radical redistribution and state owner-
ship of business. However, as Marx (2014) notes, it is not clear how support for radical par-
ties fits within the political economy models of party support. Motives for radical fringe
party support may be noninstrumental, or for reasons of registering a protest vote, rather
than representing an ideologically coherent choice. Moreover, the vote for extreme parties
may signal a feeling of threat on the part of outsiders who are afraid of increased numbers
of migrants, who have been widely scapegoated by fringe parties as posing direct competi-
tion for jobs among especially the low-skilled. Thus it remains unclear how labor market
risk among different types of outsiders, as compared with insiders, translates into support
for anti-system parties of the right or left.
Therefore, summarizing the above theoretical expectations from the literature into test-
able hypotheses, we derive the following, at times competing, hypotheses:
H1: Outsiders are more likely to abstain from voting than insiders.
H2: Outsiders are less likely to vote for the major right than are insiders.
H2a: Outsiders are more likely to vote for the major right than are insiders.
H3: Outsiders are more likely to vote for the major left than are insiders.
H3a: Outsiders are less likely to vote for the major left than are insiders.
H4: Outsiders are more likely to vote for radical parties on either end of the ideological spectrum
than are insiders.
Paradoxically, the above literature review underscores both expectations that outsiderness
impacts political behavior in some way, as well as ambivalence about what exactly this
impact should be, and via what mechanisms.2 The social risks associated with outsider sta-
tus are expected to drive preferences, and, thus, also political behavior. We therefore test the
voting behavior of outsiders using four different operationalizations found in the literature,
to see whether and which ones carry explanatory power, and whether these different meas-
ures show consistent results across the operationalizations.
4. Data, operationalization and methodology
To test these propositions of previous research in a broad cross-national context, we employ
the complete five rounds of the ESS, and include all available western European countries:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
2 However, for recent research in country-specific contexts, see Marx (2016) and Emmenegger et al.
(2015).
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The choice behind this data set is motivated by a couple of factors. First, the dataset is
considered to be one of the most robust cross-sectional sources of individual-level data in
Europe. Second, the dataset includes five rounds carried out in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and
2010, thus giving us a broad overview of the first decade of the 21st century.3 Using the ESS
thus provides extensive, high-quality cross-sectional information spanning multiple years,
which is highly suitable for the types of analyses that we conduct in this article. On the
downside, the ESS data collection is not associated with national elections, and thus may
come at various points in the electoral cycle, introducing potential bias. To address this, we
control for the time elapsed between the time of interview and the latest national election.
We also re-estimate our results on a constrained sample of those respondents who were
interviewed for the ESS within 300 days of the last national election.
To assess outsiders’ actions at the ballot box, we estimate multinomial logit (MNL)4
models predicting five possible vote choices: (a) vote for the radical left, (b) vote for the
major left, (c) vote for the major right, (d) vote for the radical right, (e) abstain. Please see
Table A19 in the Supplementary Appendix for details concerning the specific parties in each
party family.
As our key predictor of vote choice, we use the four different conceptions of outsiders
discussed above. Specifically, we use the Schwander and H€ausermann (2013) continuous
employment biography profile operationalization. This operationalization considers outsi-
derness as a function of the risk of being in atypical employment and/or unemployment,
which is assumed to be based on occupational group, gender and age. Occupational classes
are defined as five categories based on occupational structure (for details, see H€ausermann
and Schwander 2011). These groups are further disaggregated by gender and age (above or
below 40 years of age), which leads to the creation of 17 categories. Then, the authors use
EU-SILC data from 2007, and compare the category-specific rates of unemployment and
atypical employment with the average rate in the workforce. In the continuous measure the
authors ‘subtract the workforce average rate from the group-specific rate and use the
difference as value of labour market vulnerability or ‘degree of outsiderness’, that [they]
then attribute to all individuals in the specific group’ (Schwander and H€ausermann, 2013,
p. 254).5 This continuous measure ranges from 1.68 to 2.30, where values lower than 0
signify lower than average risk of atypical employment or unemployment, while values
3 We do not use the 2012 ESS wave, as this may introduce idiosyncratic effects caused by the onset
of the global financial and sovereign debt crisis.
4 An alternative statistical approach would be to use a multinomial probit (MNP) model. While this
model has a number of advantages, such as assigning each respondent only those choices that
were actually available to him/her based on the respondent’s country or even electoral district, they
are computationally extremely difficult. Other evidence suggests that the simpler MNL model is pref-
erable over the MNP model in many instances (Dow and Endersby, 2004; Kropko, 2008). When we
attempted to estimate our model with MNP, the computer failed to find a solution after 30 hours of
calculation. Other modeling alternatives to deal with varying choice set are currently being consid-
ered, but are complex and unestablished (see Yamamoto, 2010). However, in order to address the
problem of estimating vote for choices in countries where they are not present, which affects 5
choices out of 85 total (17 countries with 5 choices each), we re-estimated our model only on those
countries where all five estimated choices are available.
5 Please note that we apply the Schwander and H€ausermann coding scheme verbatim, as the authors
were so kind as to share their code.
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greater than 0 signify greater than average risk. Second, we use the Rehm (2009) opera-
tionalization of occupational risk. This measure considers individual’s risk of unemploy-
ment as a function of the rate of unemployment in her occupation (at the first digit ISCO-
88 level) in a given country and year. Third, we use the Rueda operationalization of out-
siders. This coding considers as outsiders individuals who have (a) limited contracts, or (b)
who are unemployed and seeking work. Insiders are those employed with permanent con-
tracts. This operationalization excludes farmers and students (Rueda, 2006; see also
Lindvall and Rueda, 2013). Finally, we use the Emmenegger operationalization, focusing
on the ordered categories of (a) upscales: those in paid employment with unlimited con-
tracts and in a privileged position in the labor market, operationalized as being in the top
ESeC category; (b) insiders: those in paid employment with unlimited contracts, but not in
privileged positions (ESeC 6¼ 1); outsiders, who are divided into three groups: (c) those
with limited work contracts; (d) those working part-time (less than 30 hours a week); and
(e) those unemployed (Emmenegger, 2009).
To control for typical socioeconomic and cultural attributes considered relevant for vote
choice, our models include predictors for gender, age, education, household income, union
membership, ethnic minority status and religious service attendance. We also control for
household composition by including a variable measuring whether an individual lives alone
or with a partner.6
Finally, the models control for a number of country-level characteristics. First, given
that the level of proportionality of the electoral system may affect voters’ willingness to sup-
port parties less likely to enter parliament in less proportional systems, we control for elec-
toral district magnitude. Second, in line with Rueda (2005) we control for the overall
level of unemployment in each country, as this is a proxy for the relative size of the outsider
group and for the general economic situation in the country. Third, we control for the
time elapsed between the data collection (survey interview) and the last national
legislative election, in order to capture any electoral cycle effects. Finally, to capture different
levels of economic development across our cases, we control for per capita GDP at purchas-
ing power parity and constant 2005 international dollars (World Bank Development
Indicators).
We have carried out a number of robustness checks that increase our confidence in our
results. As mentioned above, we first reassessed our models using a constrained sample of
those respondents who were interviewed within 300 days of a national election. Second, we
re-estimated our MNL models on a constrained set of countries where all five vote choices
were available. Finally, we re-estimated our results using binary logistic regression. Given its
relative simplicity compared with the main MNL models, these models also included coun-
try and time period dummy variables. The results of all these models, available in the
Supplementary Appendix, corroborate the substantive findings of our primary MNL
models.
6 Please note that household effects are also controlled for by virtue of including household, not indi-
vidual, income.
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5. Analyses and results
Our results produce three general conclusions. First, there is a consistent effect of all types of
outsiderness on abstention and (lack of) support for the major right. Second, the risk-based
(Schwander/H€ausermann and Rehm) and the status-based (Rueda and Emmenegger) opera-
tionalizations predict divergent effects of outsiderness regarding vote for radical parties.
Third, Emmenegger’s disaggregated operationalization of outsiders into more specific sub-
groups predicts diverse behavior. We consider these results in turn. Table 2 provides an
overview of the key results, while Figure 1 to 5 present them graphically.7
We find powerful and consistent evidence that being an outsider, no matter how the con-
cept is operationalized, matters for two outcomes. First, as expected in H1, outsiders are sig-
nificantly more likely to abstain from the ballot box. Under the Schwander/H€ausermann and
Rehm continuous operationalizations, going from being an insider (having extremely low level
of risk) to being a complete outsider (having an extremely high level of risk) increases the
probability of abstention by over 20 percentage points. Under the Rueda binary operationali-
zation, outsiders are 5.6 percentage points more likely to abstain from voting than insiders.
Under the Emmenegger categorical operationalization, temporary workers and the unem-
ployed are 4.5 and 7.5 percentage points more likely, respectively, to abstain than insiders.
Part-time workers, however, do not behave significantly differently from insiders.
Table 2. Effects of outsiderness
Vote Choice Schwander/H€ausermann continuous Rehm Rueda Emmenegger
Radical Left 0.088* 0.015 0.014* Temporary 0.013*
Part-time 0.008*
Unemployed 0.008
Major Left 0.006 0.033 0.030* Temporary 0.021*
Part-time 0.022*
Unemployed 0.039*
Major Right 0.162* 0.244* 0.036* Temporary 0.024*
Part-time 0.026*
Unemployed 0.051*
Radical Right 0.053* 0.035* 0.003 Temporary 0.012*
Part-time 0.001
Unemployed 0.006
Abstain 0.202* 0.227* 0.056* Temporary 0.045*
Part-time 0.003
Unemployed 0.075*
Note: Predicted probability change – the change between the probability to select a given choice as outsiderness
shifts from its minimum to maximum while other predictors are held constant. In Emmenegger operationaliza-
tion we consider the change from insider to the three outsider groups.
*p< 0.05. For details see tables A1 to A5 in the Supplementary Appendix.
7 The detailed results are available in Tables A2 to A5 in the Appendix. Since these tables present mul-
tinomial logit coefficient estimates that are hard to interpret, Table A1 in the Appendix includes infor-
mation on the percentage point change in the probability of making a particular choice (voting for a
specific party family or abstaining), while other predictors are held constant.
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Second, we find consistent support for H2: outsiders are significantly less likely to sup-
port major right parties under all operationalizations. Going from the minimum to maxi-
mum on the continuous Schwander/H€ausermann and Rehm outsiderness scale decreases the
likelihood of supporting the major right by 16.2 and 24.4 percentage points respectively.
Under the Rueda binary operationalization, being an outsider reduces the likelihood of vot-
ing for the major right by 3.6 percentage points. Under the Emmenegger operationalization,
temporary workers and the unemployed are 2.4 and 5.1 percentage points less likely to sup-
port the major right than insiders respectively. Part-time workers, however, are 2.6 percent-
age points more likely to support the major right than insiders, a finding that we discuss
more below.
The results concerning hypotheses H3 and H4 differ according to operationalization
types. Concerning H3, the risk-based (Schwander/H€ausermann and Rehm) operationaliza-
tions do not predict any significant effect of outsiderness on major left vote. Under the labor
market status (Rueda and Emmenegger) operationalizations, we find that outsiders are sig-
nificantly less likely to support the major left. Rueda outsiders are 3.0 percentage points less
likely to vote for the major left than insiders. Temporary workers, part-time workers, and
the unemployed are 2.1, 2.2 and 3.9 percentage points less likely to support the major left
than insiders. The Emmenegger operationalization demonstrates further nuance of major
left vote, namely that the major left is primarily supported by insiders (as opposed to
upscales and all types of outsiders).
Results concerning H4 are also structured by operationalization type. Radical left
parties are significantly less likely to be supported by Schwander and H€ausermann
risk-based outsiders. On the contrary, the radical left is significantly more likely to be
supported by outsiders defined by labor market status. Rueda outsiders vote for it 1.4
percentage points more likely than outsiders. Similarly, temporary workers under the
Emmenegger operationalization are 1.3 percentage points more likely to vote for the radical
left. The unemployed, as well as Rehm outsiderness, do not have a significant effect.
Interestingly, part-time workers are 0.8 percentage points less likely to support the radical
left.
The radical right, on the contrary, is more likely to be supported by risk-based outsiders.
Under the Schwander/H€ausermann and Rehm operationalizations, extreme outsiders
are 5.3 and 3.5 percentage points respectively more likely to vote for the radical right
than extreme insiders. On the contrary, Emmenegger temporary workers are 1.2
percentage points less likely to vote for the radical right than insiders. Part-time workers, the
unemployed, and Rueda outsiders do not demonstrate a significant effect on radical right
vote.
Finally, the divergent results for the three disaggregated types of Emmenegger outsiders
suggest that diverse outsider characteristics lead to varying electoral behavior. Compared to
Rueda’s operationalization of outsiders, which also relies on labor market status, it is
Emmenegger’s temporary workers that behave much like the Rueda outsiders—they tend to
support the radical left significantly more, the major left and right significantly less, the radi-
cal right significantly less, and they are significantly less likely to turn out to vote than
insiders. The unemployed behave very similarly to Rueda outsiders, but their status does
not produce any significant predictions concerning radical left and right vote.
However, being unemployed is a more powerful predictor of the other outcomes. The unem-
ployed are more likely to abstain, and less likely to vote for the major left and right than
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Rueda outsiders. Importantly, those individuals working part-time do not seem to act like
outsiders at all. In fact, in the case of voting for the major left and right, their behavior
is exactly the opposite of other outsiders. Part-time workers are significantly less likely to
support the major left, significantly more likely to support the major right, and are
indistinct when it comes to turn out to vote in comparison to insiders, making the extent to
which this group should be considered ‘outsiders’ debatable. Indeed, as mentioned earlier,
80% of the part-time workers in our sample are women, of which many may work part-
time voluntarily. Therefore, the key distinction is between voluntary and involuntary part-
time work and its relationship to risk/insecurity, something that our data does not allow us
to distinguish.
The results concerning support for radical left and right parties point to a pattern sug-
gesting that risk-defined outsiders are more likely to vote for the radical right, while status-
based outsiders are more likely to lean towards the radical left. These outcomes merit more
detailed analyses focusing on the interplay between labor market status and social/
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Figure 1. Effect of outsiderness on radical left vote. Notes: Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence
intervals. Based on models reported in Tables A2–A5 in the Supplementary Appendix.
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occupational risk. Given the overlapping nature of the four operationalizations considered
here (demonstrated by Table 1), it is possible to define four groups of individuals in our sam-
ple: (a) those with good labor market status and low risk; (b) those with good labor market
status and high risk; (c) those with poor labor market status and low risk; and finally
(d) those with poor labor market status and high risk.8 We can consequently specify the
same vote choice model, predicting electoral behavior with membership in one of these four
groups, while maintaining the same socio-demographic and system controls discussed
above.
Figure 6 summarizes the results of these analyses, while the details are available in
Table A17 in the Supplementary Appendix. Concerning support for the radical right (left
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Figure 2. Effect of outsiderness on major left vote. Notes: Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence
intervals. Based on models reported in Tables A2–A5 in the Supplementary Appendix.
8 We define these groups using the Rehm risk-based, and the Rueda status-based operationalizations.
Since the Rehm operationalization is continuous, we treat those with lower risk than the median as
‘low risk’, and those with higher risk than the median as ‘high risk’.
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panel), it shows that individuals at high risk tend to support the radical right more than indi-
viduals at low risk. This effect is particularly pronounced for those with good status and
high risk. Compared to individuals with low risk, they are over 1 percentage point signifi-
cantly more likely to vote radical right. Those with poor status and high risk are more likely
to vote for radical right; however, the difference is not statistically significant.9 Turning to
the radical left, Figure 6 demonstrates that individuals with poor labor market status are sig-
nificantly more likely to vote for the radical left, whatever their risk level. Going from good
to poor labor market status increases the probability to vote for the radical left by between
1.2 and 1.8 percentage points. These differences are statistically significant.10
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Figure 3. Effect of outsiderness on major right vote. Notes: Predicted probabilities with 95% confi-
dence intervals. Based on models reported in Tables A2–A5 in the Supplementary Appendix.
9 The statistical tests comparing the predicted probabilities of these groups are the following: Good
Status, Hi Risk vs Good Status, Lo Risk: predicted probability difference ¼ 0.013, z ¼ 4.29, P < 0.000.
Good Status, Hi Risk vs Poor Status, Low Risk: predicted probability difference ¼ 0.011, z ¼ 2.55, P <
0.011.
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These results thus suggest that individuals in poor labor market standing tend to turn
toward left-wing political solutions, likely seeking social protection and state support. On
the contrary, those at risk—and particularly those with good labor market status, but at risk
of losing it—turn toward radical right forces that focus on issues of immigration. This claim
is further substantiated when we predict individual left–right placement and views on
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Figure 4. Effect of outsiderness on radical right vote. Notes: Predicted probabilities with 95% confi-
dence intervals. Based on models reported in Tables A2–A5 in the Supplementary Appendix.
10 The statistical tests comparing the predicted probabilities of these groups are the following:
Poor Status, Lo Risk vs Good Status, Lo Risk: predicted probability difference ¼ 0.013, z ¼ 2.36,
P < 0.018.
Poor Status, Hi Risk vs Good Status, Lo Risk: predicted probability difference ¼ 0.012, z ¼ 2.16,
P < 0.030.
Poor Status, Lo Risk vs Good Status, Hi Risk: predicted probability difference ¼ 0.018, z ¼ 3.05,
P < 0.002.
Poor Status, Hi Risk vs Good Status, Hi Risk: predicted probability difference ¼ 0.018, z ¼ 3.37,
P < 0.001.
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immigration with the four groups, while maintaining the same controls. The results,
reported in Figure 7 (for details, see Table A18 in the Supplementary Appendix), support
this reading. Individuals with poor labor market status (and particularly with poor status
and low risk), tend to be more left-leaning than those with good status. Even more strik-
ingly, individuals at high risk tend to be significantly more opposed to immigration than
individuals at low risk, no matter their labor market status.
6. Conclusion
In this article, we have explored divergent conceptualizations and operationalizations of out-
siderness, focusing on their effects on voting behavior. While questions of why outsiderness
matters in the labor market and how the insider–outsider distinction has developed in the
postindustrial era have garnered substantial attention in recent years, the literature provides
a multiplicity of distinct, even divergent, understandings of outsiderness. This article adds to
the literature by addressing the effect of the distinct outsider operationalizations on political
behavior across Europe. Our results point to several conclusions about outsiderness at the
ballot box, as well as about the conceptualization of outsiderness.
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
-1.7 -1 0 1 2.4
Outsiderness
Continuous
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Outsiderness
Continuous
Rehm
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
Insider Outsider
Outsider
Binary
Rueda
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
Upsc Insid Temp Part-t Unem
Outsiderness
Categorical
Emmenegger
Abstain
Figure 5. Effect of outsiderness on abstention. Notes: Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence
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First, we identify two broad strands of outsider operationalizations. The first, based on
labor market status, addresses insiders/outsiders based on a static snapshot of current labor
market situation, whether employed on permanent contracts (insiders) or employed on tem-
porary contracts, part-time, or unemployed (outsiders). The second, rooted in occupational
class categories and their collective social risk, identifies outsiders as a function of the occu-
pational group to which they belong, based on comparative rates of atypical employment
and unemployment. These two types of operationalizations lead to distinct insider–outsider
categories that show divergent characteristics and limited overlap.
Second, despite the divergent operationalizations of outsiderness that lead to distinct out-
sider categories, we find a pair of powerful and consistent conclusions that apply to all types
of outsiders. We find that outsiders are consistently more likely to abstain from voting
and consistently likely to deny their support to major right parties. This highlights the nega-
tive voting of outsiders: they either shun major right parties or turn away from the voting
stations altogether. There seems to be no unifying factor that propels them to make a consis-
tent vote for a given party; rather, they are characterized by their diversity of party
preferences.
Third, while we do not see consistent support for the hypothesis that outsiders are more
likely to support radical parties on either end of the political spectrum, our results indicate a
notable finding. Outsiders defined on the basis of occupational class group/risk propensity
(Schwander, H€ausermann and Rehm) are more likely to support radical right parties, while
outsiders defined on the basis of their current employment status (Rueda, Emmenegger) are
more likely to support radical left parties, while avoiding the major left.
Figure 6. Support for radical right and radical left across insider and outsider types. Notes: Predicted
probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Based on MNL model reported in Table A18 in the
Supplementary Appendix.
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To explain this, our additional analyses conclude that individuals from occupational
groups at risk of outsiderness are attracted to right-wing populist rhetoric, usually
focusing on anti-immigrant themes. On the contrary, individuals who actually face
suboptimal labor market status (unemployed, temporarily employed), tend toward left-
wing populist rhetoric, focusing on the state’s role in job creation and social support. This
underlines not only the diverse character of the outsider group, but primarily the diverse
analytical consequences of the different outsider conceptualizations, and their focus on
either risk or status. Furthermore, our findings that individuals at risk seek right-wing
authoritarian solutions echo insights from political psychology that finds associations
between social threat and individual authoritarianism (e.g. Feldman and Stenner, 1997;
Duckitt and Fisher, 2003). Our analyses emphasize that the effect of labor market risk on
support for right-wing authoritarian parties is largely independent of actual labor market
status.
While the labels of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ are not one-size-fits-all monikers, our findings
suggest the importance of distinguishing between status- and risk-based operationalizations
of the concept. Future research should further unpack these as to their distinguishing fea-
tures, as well as how their component parts differ across countries, time, segments of the
labor market, and so on. Furthermore, as distinct types of outsiders become more prominent
in society, research should focus on how political parties respond (or not) to this social phe-
nomenon, considering the interaction between evolving employment structures, external
shocks such as financial crises or increasing migration, and how people at social and labor
market risk perceive such developments. These may then translate into distinct electoral
Figure 7. Left–right and immigration preferences of insider and outsider groups. Notes: Predicted val-
ues with 95% confidence intervals. Based on OLS models reported in Table A19 in the Supplementary
Appendix. Dependent variables are left-right self-placement (lrscale) and views on whether immi-
grants make a country worse or better place to live (imwbcnt).
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behavior or increased rates of retreat from the political arena altogether, posing problems
for democratic accountability.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available at Socio-Economic Review Journal online.
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